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CHAPTER 8
Challenging Psychiatric Classification: 
Healthy Autistic Diversity 
the Neurodiversity Movement
Erika Dyck and Ginny Russell
IntroductIon
Beginning after the Second World War, amid the momentum of civil 
rights, feminism and gay and lesbian rights movements, patients’ rights 
groups began campaigning for their place in the human rights discourse. 
Disability rights activists engaged in aggressive campaigns for better 
access to services, while psychiatric patients and their families began 
lobbying for anti-stigma campaigns, alongside demands for adequate 
housing, basic health services, voting rights, and access to safe employ-
ment. The concept of ‘mad pride’ emerged in the 1960s and, like other 
pride movements, challenged the notion that madness, or gayness, 
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or femaleness, was a disease to be treated rather than an identity to be 
celebrated.1 At its heart, mad pride campaigns took aim at psychiatry 
for codifying mental health into a system of deficits and disorders that 
required medical interventions to fix, rather than look to political action 
as a mechanism for producing a culture of acceptance. The late twenti-
eth century has been a time of expansion in both the utilisation of the 
diagnostic label of autism and the reach of the ‘neurodiversity’ concept, 
and we situate the work of this group in the context of previous patient 
movements.
Embracing ‘madness’ as a preferred term over ones such as men-
tal disease, defect, disability, or illness reconnected an experience with 
an identity that was not necessarily the product of a medical encoun-
ter. Intellectuals in the 1960s began critiquing modern social values, in 
part, by analysing the history psychiatry and how it had evolved into a 
form of policing behaviour. They held psychiatry accountable for passing 
judgement on human value and in harnessing their practice to a political 
system that equated human worth with productivity.2 Classifications sys-
tems, such as the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM), they argued, merely institutionalised a practice of pathologising 
undesirable or unproductive people.
Famously, French philosopher, Michel Foucault in his first book Folie 
de la Raison (1961), translated into English under the title, Madness and 
Civilization (1965), trenchantly critiqued the rise of psychiatry and how 
it psychiatrised and attempted to control normal behaviour.3 Madness, for 
Foucault, not only existed as a state that predated the rise of psychiatry as 
a discipline, but was also reminiscent of a point in time when mad peo-
ple had a small degree of autonomy and when madness itself was part of 
one’s character, not an affliction, label, or burden. Foucault lamented the 
rise of a modern world where psychiatrists wielded significant and, in his 
view, illegitimate power to determine what was and what was not accept-
able behaviour. In a society where free will was leached away by mod-
ern aspirations of productivity, capital accumulation, and moral authority, 
Foucault critiqued how this world order created opportunities for individ-
uals to police normalcy and to discipline members of society. His influen-
tial work on this topic ricocheted through the intellectual community and 
contributed to the rise of anti-psychiatry during the 1960s.
Some contemporary critics, including Thomas Szasz, a psychia-
trist ultimately based in California, pronounced that ‘mental illness 
was a myth’, which had no basis in scientific or medical reasoning.4  
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The evolution of an ‘anti-psychiatry’ perspective, which sometimes cross- 
fertilised with post-modernism, provided fodder for critiques of psychia-
try and its institutions. Another 1960s critical scholar, Erving Goffman, 
focused his doctoral work specifically on the way in which the institution 
itself produced abnormal behaviours, due to the disciplined existence 
within its walls, the rhythms of institutional life, and the reinforced labels 
that one was forced to adopt while ‘playing a role’ or meeting the expec-
tations of a psychiatric diagnosis.5 Scottish psychiatrist R. D. Laing added 
further grist to the mill by provocatively suggesting that madness offered 
insights into higher orders of consciousness; in other words, madness 
stimulated creativity, intelligence and allowed an individual to see past 
certainties held in check by the majority of society—the so-called sane.6
These academic critiques provided some of the intellectual, philosoph-
ical, and linguistic foundations for a more widespread social movement, 
which was populated by individuals who had consumed and survived 
mental health services (henceforth referred to as consumer/survivor 
movements). The timing was important. In the 1960s, governments 
throughout North America and Europe began closing, downsizing, 
and repurposing large psychiatric hospitals. Thousands of patients were 
moved into communities, unleashing a new host of challenges as former 
patients carried stigmatising labels, behaviours, and habits with them into 
communities that were often unwelcoming.7 This major transition in 
mental health service provision—from asylum-based care to an undiffer-
entiated matrix of health, welfare, education, and labour support—also 
gave rise to new forms of activism, as former patients and their families 
repositioned themselves in civil society.
Mad pride, the disability rights movement, the recovery movement, 
and other consumer/survivor movements emerged alongside these 
intellectual critiques of psychiatry and provided a poignant example of 
people denouncing psychiatric labelling and instead turning psychiat-
ric experiences into sources of insight, authority, and expertise. The 
rise of consumer/survivor movements that ensued can be considered 
as a form of ‘biosociality’ a term coined more recently by Rabinow to 
describe common health identities linked by social networks.8 What the 
new movements seem to share is a repudiation of ‘victim’ status and a 
push towards greater equality with those who are considered experts, 
clinicians, researchers, or professionals who become involved after diag-
nosis. They demanded a greater involvement in determining research pri-
orities and policy decisions.9 Thanks in part to these groups, the power 
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and credibility of their first-person voice—the voice of affected individu-
als—are increasingly acknowledged nowadays in health policy and clinical 
guidelines.
The 1960s patients’ rights movements that relied on anti-psychiatry 
critiques have evolved considerably and have splintered and developed 
different approaches under the umbrella of social health activism. Today, 
one area of resistance to psychiatric labelling channelled by patients 
themselves is from those who have been diagnosed with neurodevel-
opmental conditions of childhood such as attention deficit hyperac-
tivity disorder, dyslexia, Tourette’s syndrome, and in particular autism. 
A politically mobilised group of adults with autism spectrum disorder 
(here referred to as ASD or simply autism), and sometimes their rela-
tives, pioneered the neurodiversity movement (NDM). The NDM voice 
rejects society’s disablement of difference while advocating a neurologi-
cal/medical model for autistic behaviour. In this chapter, we examine the 
position of the NDM, with reference to other mental health consumer/
survivor/patient movements and their challenges to psychiatric classifica-
tion in the past.
the neurodIversIty MoveMent
I am autistic. I’ve always been autistic, and I always will be autistic. Autism 
is part of who I am, just as my sense of humor and my emotions are part of 
me. I like who I am, even my autistic part.10
‘Neurodiversity’ is a concept that implies that neurological difference is 
best understood as an inherent and valuable part of the range of human 
variation, rather than a pathological form of difference. The NDM 
met and mobilised in the late twentieth century through utilising 
websites such as Aspies for Freedom, The Autist, Autcom, Angelfire, 
Wrongplanet, and Neurodiversity.com, most of which are based in the 
USA or Europe. Numerous online chat rooms, blogs, and fora are spring-
ing up where autistic adults discuss common interests and make friends 
across international and geographical boundaries. The rise of the internet  
in the late twentieth century enabled mobilisation and creation of online 
communities in geographically dispersed areas, occupying virtual social 
spaces that are constructed and normative in their effects.11 Many autistic 
people started ‘coming out’ with pride, asserting minority cultural status, 
adopting similar strategies to the earlier gay rights movement. Many of 
8 CHALLENGING PSYCHIATRIC CLASSIFICATION: HEALTHY AUTISTIC …  171
the arguments of the NDM relate to the autism diagnosis as a category or 
label. NDM voices taken from open access neurodiversity and autism sites 
are quoted here to illustrate their position.
The theory of labelling has a long history and activists and practition-
ers alike have struggled to come to terms with whether psychiatric labels 
help to reduce stigma and encourage research and treatment, or whether 
they merely reinforce a particular negative characterisation of behaviour 
that becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. The neurodiversity movement in 
this respect is not unlike other survivor, consumer, or disability rights 
campaigns that both resist labels and rely on labels to forge a sense of 
community. Even amongst the most radical anti-psychiatry groups, the 
relationship with medical language has produced a common touchstone 
for identifying community and fostering a more positive image of iden-
tity. For example, Canada’s earliest expression of organised mad pride 
emerged in the 1960s from a consortium of people who had been insti-
tutionalised for psychiatric disorders in Vancouver. As they discussed 
the appropriate name for their community-based group, they settled on 
Mad Patients’ Association (MPA). The name blended philosophies of the 
de- or anti-medicalised term ‘madness’ with the explicit term ‘patient’, 
conveying a relationship with medicine. This self-conscious choice of 
names thus embraced the ethos of the survivors, or the radical edge of 
anti-psychiatric views—those who survived in spite of psychiatric inter-
ventions, and the consumer model—those who have relied on psychiatric 
services, from the perspective of an autonomous client or user.
AutIsM As A dIAgnostIc cAtegory
Kanner and Asperger first described ‘insistence on sameness’ and ‘autis-
tic aloneness’ over 70 years ago.12 As was explained by O’Reilly, Lester, 
and Kiyimba in Chapter 7, according to today’s DSM-5, autism diag-
nosis is given where there is (1) impairment in behaviours within the 
social/communication domain and (2) sensory issues and/or repetitive 
behaviours. Autism as a phenotype thus creates a category of persons 
who share social/communication impairment and repetitive behaviours, 
although the evidence that these symptoms are co-inherited is fairly 
weak.13 Essentially, the diagnosis depends on a deficit-based description 
of a person, creating a ‘spoiled identity’ in Goffman’s terms. Since the 
first epidemiological prevalence estimates were conducted in the 1970s 
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the autism diagnosis has seen an exponential rise, changing from a diag-
nosis given to an estimated one in two thousand to one in forty children. 
This rise is partly due to increased awareness and partly due to chang-
ing boundaries of diagnostic criteria, with intellectually able individu-
als included in the category of Asperger’s disorder in the 1990s. Such 
changes, coupled with the advent of the internet, meant that for the first 
time, many twentieth-century children were identified with autism, and 
as they grew up, many had the means, the motivation, and the intellec-
tual resources to challenge a purely medical understanding of ASD. In 
the 1990s, Martijn Dekker of the Netherlands founded Independent 
Living on the Autistic Spectrum (InLv), an e-mail list for autistic people. 
First run by hand on dial-up, InLv was the first fully autistic-run, self-
hosted online autism community. The effect was to promote discussion 
of how autism could be a benefit as well as create challenges, fostering 
in its subscribers a ‘healthy autistic’ identity. The community became the 
forerunner to the NDM.
Autism is not currently identified by neurological markers as none are 
reliable enough to create diagnostic tests, although ASDs are classified as 
‘neurodevelopmental disorders’ in the DSM. Despite the NDM’s focus 
on the ‘neuro’, it is behavioural inventories that are used to diagnose 
ASD, not brain scans, and these use a dimensional scale of impairment 
with a cut-off rather than a dichotomous distinction. In the diagnostic 
process, the point at which individual differences in behaviour constitute 
autism is based on clinical decisions which may depend on resources that 
diagnosis will trigger, the meaning of diagnosis to the patient or clini-
cians’ own ideas about signs and signifiers of autism. This, a somewhat 
arbitrary cut-off is used on the autism spectrum to define autism as a 
diagnosed disorder. This process is heavily influenced by culture, con-
text, and values.14 Chloe Silverman argues that the concept of autism as 
a diagnostic category has been established in the DSM and International 
Classification of Disease (ICD) and stabilised through the work of insti-
tutions such as schools, gene banks, professional associations, charities, 
government committees, parent networks, and those with vested inter-
est in treatments.15 The DSM and ICD systems are tools for classi-
fication of disorder that are themselves shaped by moral and historical 
values.16 These aspects underscore the shifting nature of autism diagnosis 
and remind us that the idea of ASD as a fixed underlying biological/
neurological entity (the purely medical model) requires qualification. 
Moreover, part of the pushback on these categories is coming from peo-
ple who have been placed in them.
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The Position of the NDM
The NDM has articulated a number of central features or core values, all of 
which stem from a denial of pathologisation and a critique of labelling as 
a harmful action against diversity. Each of these tenets is discussed below:
Opposing Elimination and Cure
Opposition to Cure of autism was frequently expressed as a rationale for 
online activity of NDM members:
We are deeply concerned with the perception of autism as a disorder and 
the attempts to cure and prevent autism. In addition we are concerned 
about attempts to help autistic people that actually harm them. The purpose 
of this website is to educate the public about the anti-cure perspective.17
Michelle Dawson, a Canadian academic diagnosed with autism, has ques-
tioned the ethics of treatments such as applied behaviour analysis (ABA) 
and appeared as an expert witness in the 2004 legal case where parents of 
autistic children filed to get medical insurance to cover the cost of treat-
ment, claiming it was a medical necessity. Her position was that ABA’s 
techniques of aversion, which persistently expose children with ASD to 
stimuli that cause distress and subsequently discourage unwanted behav-
iours such as hand-flapping, are tantamount to cruelty. Dawson considers 
these unwanted behaviours to be coping mechanisms in stressful situations:
Where ABA needs scrutiny is when its power is used to remove odd behav-
iours which may be useful and necessary to the autistic (such as rocking, 
flapping, and analytical, rather than social or ‘imaginative’ play); and when 
typical, expected behaviours which may be stressful, painful, or useless to 
the autistic (such as pointing, joint attention, appropriate gaze, and eye 
contact) are imposed.18
Others within the movement have criticised therapies, which attempt 
to remove autistic behaviours, claiming for example that the repetitive 
behaviours are valid attempts to communicate.19
Neurotypical people pity autistics. I pity neurotypicals. I pity anyone who 
cannot feel the way that flapping your hands just so amplifies everything 
you feel and thrusts it up into the air. … A boy pacing by himself, flapping 
and humming and laughing. …A shake of the fingers in front of the eyes, 
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a monologue, an echolaliated phrase. All of these things autistic people are 
supposed to be ashamed of and stop doing? They are how we communi-
cate our joy.20
In their opposition to ‘elimination’ and invoking the term ‘genocide’, the 
NDM has drawn on and shares a stance with the earlier ‘survivor’ move-
ment. Similarly, people who were sexually sterilised under the eugenics 
programme in Alberta, Canada, have worked closely with community 
advocates and scholars to produce a ‘survivor’-based website that exam-
ines the history of eugenics from their perspectives.21 Survivors reject 
psychiatry outright, likening psychiatric treatment to a form of slav-
ery and an outright abuse of power. Anthropologist Gabriella Coleman 
has suggested that some people have embraced that language of sur-
vival—much akin to the language of the NDM—strategically to under-
score their resilience after decades, even centuries, of oppression.22 The 
resulting movement, Coleman contends, ‘mobilizes the cultural ideal of 
freedom and self-determination, along with the law of human rights and 
informed consent, to undermine the moral, scientific, and legal claims 
furthered by the pharmaceutical companies and other authoritative psy-
chiatric institutions’.23 Survivors represent the most radical voices within 
mad culture, connecting their survival, self-consciously, to a form of resil-
ience. This terminology intentionally invites connotations of genocide by 
linking identity with a social group, such as a race or ethnicity.24
Use of Neurocentric/Medical Models
The NDM seems to have its roots in the social model of disability, which 
separates physical and biological impairment from the disabling attitudes 
and practices of society.25
People with autistic spectrum disorders are not victims of autism, they are 
victims of society. They do not suffer from their developmental differences, 
they suffer from prejudice, ignorance, lack of understanding, exploitation, 
verbal abuse - all this and more from that sector of society which considers 
itself socially able.26
The NDM has also sprung from the twentieth-century trend dubbed 
‘neurocentrism’ by Satel and Lilienfeld who define neurocentrism as ‘the 
view that human experience and behavior can be best explained from 
the predominant or even exclusive perspective of the brain’, which they 
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argue, has increasingly been adopted in parallel with the rise of neurosci-
ence throughout the last half of the last century and into this.27 Applying 
neurological explanations to one’s mind has further been described by 
Rose as the ‘neurochemical self ’.28 Neurocentrism is therefore a descrip-
tion of the extent to which neuroscientific theories, practices, tech-
nologies, and therapies are influencing how we view ourselves (those 
identities and characteristics ascribed to self and views of others). The 
term ‘neurodiversity’ implies the movement predominantly understand 
their differences in terms of innate neurology, the brain and/or wiring, 
perhaps underpinned with genetic causes. Language has been devel-
oped describing people as either ‘neurotypical’ (NT, not on the autism 
spectrum) or ‘neurodivergent’, i.e. people like themselves (non-NT). 
‘Neurotypical’ is a term now widely adopted in academic neuroscience. 
The NDM, then, uses the language of brain wiring or neurology to 
explain the nature of their differences. The differences in how the brain 
communicates then result in behavioural differences. One NDM advo-
cate explained it this way:
Another common sign that someone is an NT? Touching. NTs enjoy all 
sorts of physical contact and often use touch to greet friends, family and 
even casual acquaintances… NTs are simply wired differently.29
As the autism phenotype is well-established, research coalesces around 
it. Neuroscientific research charts uniformities and abnormalities in the 
brain that make it possible to distinguish an autistic brain from a normal 
brain. Neuroscience seeks tangible, discrete differences between autistic 
and non-autistic brains while epidemiology tells us ASD is a spectrum 
condition extending into the sub-clinical range. In this way, neuroscience 
researchers tend to dichotomise brain structure for what is essentially a 
dimensional condition. By looking at differences between dichotomised 
autistic/non-autistic phenotypes (as opposed to a dimensional spectrum 
of traits in the whole population), medical neuroscience models tend to 
homogenise autistic brains.30 This is analogous to the dichotomisation of 
difference between ‘neurotypical’ and ‘neurodivergent’ persons identified 
by the NDM; it refers to an essential difference in brain structure and/
or functioning. Thus, the NDM adopts a position that both challenges 
and shores up medicalisation: while questioning autism and other neu-
rodevelopmental conditions as diagnosable ‘disorders’, it utilises a model 
derived from neuroscientific research.
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The rise of neurocentrism is transdisciplinary in its reach. Historian 
Daniel Smail has developed this idea as an overarching ontology that, if 
applied carefully, has the potential to disrupt our commonly held beliefs 
about diversity and difference over time. He proposes a ‘neuro-histor-
ical’ approach that locates the beginning of history at a moment when 
humans approach a state of consciousness; he defines this moment in 
neuro-biological terms as the evolutionary stage that separates humans 
from animals. Pinpointing this moment, he argues, requires careful col-
laboration with scientists to sift through new kinds of evidence—biolog-
ical and neurochemical evidence—to re-interpret the origins of history. 
Part of Smail’s justification for a turn to neuro-history is that it offers a 
deeper, richer account of humanity by acknowledging human bio[neu-
ro]-diversity. He recommends shifting the historians’ gaze away from 
political structures, social arrangements, or even cultural expressions and 
looking instead to neuro-history.31 This conceptualisation of neurodiver-
sity is not unlike some of R. D. Laing’s suggestions in the 1960s that 
schizophrenia could be productively understood as an alternative form of 
consciousness. Rather than view psychotic symptoms as deficits or abnor-
mal characteristics, Laing considered that delusions, paranoid ideation, 
and other kinds of behaviour might produce a form of intelligible insight 
into human interactions.32
Objections to Diagnosis as a Category of Disorder
Diagnosis of autism is recommended by health guidelines as an essen-
tial way to access treatments.33 However, many autistic adults in the 
NDM feel that both experts and families misinterpret or take no notice 
of them.34 Autism, they argue, should not be considered as pathological, 
i.e. in terms of a medical condition, but in terms of the normal varia-
tion of the human population; thus, many in their ranks oppose medical 
description in terms of diagnosis of an ASD.
The autistic community firmly believes that autism is not a disorder but a 
natural human variation. We are deeply concerned with the perception of 
autism as a disorder.35
A core argument is that the extreme end of the autism spectrum (i.e. 
reaching diagnostic thresholds) is required for the existence of a healthy 
gene pool in the human population. Without these people, the range of 
natural human variation is reduced, and the strengths that autism brings, 
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such as ability to focus and systemising skills, will be lost. Such variation 
in the gene pool is desirable for evolutionary reasons, the NDM contest.
It may be that autistic people are essentially different from “normal” peo-
ple, and it is precisely those differences that make them invaluable to the 
ongoing evolution of the human race.36
This argument matches some of the historical anti-psychiatry arguments, 
particularly those of Laing, who suggested that people with psychotic 
disorders had a lot to offer society due to the gift of insight that they 
had into situations that non-psychotic people could not even appreciate. 
Within the neurodiversity movement, a similar sentiment circulates, sug-
gesting that some autistic people also have particular areas of strength 
or talent formerly known in the medical literature as ‘islets of ability’.37 
Members of the NDM point out that all these aspects of autism will be 
lost if people like them are ‘cured’ or aborted as babies.
Many of the traits I identify with most strongly are those labelled autistic, 
such as the ability to hyperfocus, a strong attention to detail, the ability 
to enjoy my own company for long periods, not being controlled by the 
social collective, etc.38
There are several historical precedents where conditions have been 
de-medicalised in the past, through activism of politically mobilised 
social movements. The classic example of de-medicalisation in the twen-
tieth century is homosexuality, which was listed as a disorder in the 
second edition of the DSM, becoming a treatable medical condition 
rather than a behaviour that had previously been seen as morally wrong. 
Hormone treatments and castrations were used to ‘cure’ homosexuality 
and in some cases admission to mental institutions.39 While people were 
unsuccessfully ‘treated’ or punished for homosexual behaviour in the 
past, medicine now recognises it as a dimension of a normal and healthy 
life, thanks to sustained pressure from gay activists who mobilised around 
the diagnosis in the mid-century period.40
Parallels to the NDM objection to ASD as a devastating childhood 
disorder can be seen in the transgender movement’s attempts to demed-
icalise gender identity disorder (GID) of childhood in the late twenti-
eth century. Bryant and Burke describe in depth the opposition of the 
transgender movement (TGM) to this diagnostic category which first 
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appeared in DSM-III in 1980.41 The main objections to GID diagno-
sis were that sex-stereotyped behaviour was used to define children as 
healthy or pathological, which reinforced the binary model of gender. 
The TGM objected that GIDs could result in stigmatisation of trans-
gender individuals that gender variance was no longer described as 
a range of valid ways to be, but rather had been redefined as a serious 
form of illness. The movement drew attention to treatments that were 
designed to intervene and ‘cure’ individuals of their problem. A techni-
cal objection was that existing research and clinical evidence were based 
overwhelmingly on study and treatment of boys, an argument that has 
parallels with discussions about gender and autism.42 Overall, the TGM 
raised similar objections to those of the NDM today.
Like the NDM, the TGM were vocal protesters and mobilised 
around the diagnostic category. After a concerted writing campaign to 
the American Psychiatric Association (APA, authors of DSM) in 1977, 
concerns and correspondence led to modifications in DSM-IV, where a 
less behavioural-based medical definition of GIDs was adopted. GIDs in 
DSM-IV were also subject to sustained activist objection. By the mid-
1990s, several political US-based transgender groups, including Gender 
Pac, National Centre for Lesbian Rights, and National Gay and Lesbian 
Task Force, issued stinging statements critiquing GID. In 1996, activ-
ists repeatedly picketed the APA and formed the ‘National Coalition 
for GID Reform’, and finally in 2013, GID was dropped in the DSM-5 
revised diagnostic criteria. The condition was replaced with a new cate-
gory ‘Gender Dysphoria’ which only pathologises the discontent experi-
enced as a result of gender identity issues. Some in TGM accept the new 
DSM-5 definition does go some way to demedicalise GIDs and helps to 
resolve some of their issues. Fraser, Karasic, Meyer, and Wylie, for exam-
ple, argue that changes to DSM were a direct consequence of activism 
and have led to a more acceptable diagnosis/ label and a reframing of 
the condition as they see it.43 One parallel NDM argument is that the 
term ‘disorder’ implies a pathological state, with negative and stigmatis-
ing connotations. Autism researchers have therefore called for the term 
‘autism spectrum disorder’ to be replaced by ‘autism spectrum con-
dition’, reminiscent of the replacement of the term ‘retardation’ with 
‘learning disabilities’ in the 1970s.44 This replacement of terms and 
continual refinement of diagnostic criteria is an important feature of the 
history of psychiatric disorders. However, as Jan Walmsley explained 
in Chapter 5, replacing terms does not always alter stigma indefinitely. 
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The new term may become stigmatised as its connotation may become 
the same as the old term. Even replacing autism with ‘neurodivergent’ is 
simply replacing one label with another.
Embracing Labels: Being or Having?
The NDM see autism as an integral part of their identity that they are 
disinclined to change. The autistic activist Jim Sinclair presented a talk 
called ‘Don’t Mourn for Us’ at the 1993 International Conference on 
Autism in Canada, addressed primarily to parents. It drew interest 
through its challenge to the then-dominant ‘autism as tragedy’ narrative, 
describing autism as inseparable from the person, rather than a separate 
disease entity, and as a valid way of being. Following this influential paper 
and in contrast to the requirements in medical journals, the NDM often 
prefer first-person language ‘autistic person’ to ‘person with autism’ as 
the latter implies the autism can be divorced from the individual.
Autism is not something that I have, it is something that I am. Autism is 
not a cage, with us as the prisoners.45
Many parents, by contrast, prefer the more medical term ‘person with 
autism’. Kit Weintraub, a parent who is a board member of Families for 
Early Autism Treatment, states:
My children are not autistic, they ‘have autism’…. Autism, according to 
the vast majority of medical experts today, causes severely abnormal devel-
opment, and without appropriate treatment it can condemn those affected 
to a life of isolation and dependency. “Autistics” is a rather new political-
ly-correct term that I find troubling; it is a label that attempts to define 
people with autism as members of an elite group of human beings who 
differ from the rest of us only in terms of their unique talents and their 
superior way of experiencing the world.46
However, some autistic people have argued against this viewpoint. 
Michelle Dawson retorted that ‘person with autism’ was equivalent to 
describing herself as a ‘person with femaleness’.
Autism is a way of being. It is pervasive; it colors every experience, every 
sensation, perception, thought, emotion, and encounter, every aspect of 
existence. It is not possible to separate the autism from the person.47
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Examining some of the online sources suggests that that parents, teach-
ers, and even siblings are indeed present within the NDM community, 
but their relationship to the movement is different. Unlike the bold 
statements about being autistic, not having autism—parents fill a differ-
ent role in their relationship to children who are considered autistic. This 
triangulating effect may force us to return to a different set of histori-
cal trends. That of familiar arguments about pre-natal screening, moth-
er-blaming, food additives, and other environmental factors that cast the 
net over a much wider set of influences for contributing—whether posi-
tively or negatively—to the neurodiversity identity. American philosopher 
and psychiatrist Carl Elliot has described this cascading effect in terms 
of contagion or that of being ‘sick by association’ or courtesy stigma 
idea.48 The resulting labelling of entire families or perhaps groups creates 
another layer of complexity as we examine the process of identity build-
ing and forms of activism that are created to challenge or embrace these 
labels.
For the NDM, although opposed to the notion that they suffer 
from ‘disorder’, the label of ‘autism’ has become both an identity and 
a rallying cry. Increasingly activism occurs online, and occasionally this 
becomes a physical meeting. In 1995, Autreat was founded. This is an 
annual conference that accommodates autistic difficulties, e.g. partic-
ipants wear colour-coded badges indicating whether or not they may 
be approached for conversation. Autreat endeavours to create an ideal 
NDM environment that eliminates disablement through tolerance and 
adaptation and challenges the status of autism as a psychiatric disorder.
dIverse PersPectIves WIthIn socIAl heAlth  
And survIvor MoveMents
As the scholarship on this topic has illustrated, the approaches taken by 
social health and survivor movements are varied, complex, and change 
over time. The language of survival versus consumption provides one 
broad set of generalisations for understanding the political stances within 
this multifaceted set of movements. Even within organised campaigns, 
however, there is significant granularity that can range from libertarian to 
socialist perspectives regarding how people should be cared for, accepted, 
and tolerated in modern society. Within debates over the medicalisa-
tion and treatment of addiction, for example, scholars and practitioners 
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continue to disagree on whether the twelve-step model of recovery 
developed in the twentieth century offers a sufficiently de-medicalised 
approach, or whether it should be used at all. Some have suggested that 
individuals need a menu of treatment options that might change over 
time, which superficially may appear as though they subscribe to differ-
ent models of addiction altogether.49 The fluidity, however, is important 
in these rights-based campaigns as individuals develop different relation-
ships with practitioners, services, and gaps in the mental health system.
Similarly, the position of the autistic community vis a vis diagnosis of 
autism is not homogenous. While some activists argue that the diagno-
sis of autism spectrum ‘disorder’ implies a pathological state, with neg-
ative and stigmatising connotations, many other adults describe their 
relief and understanding once a diagnosis is given; a label that makes 
sense of a lifetime of struggle. High profile cases have included Susan 
Boyle who described her relief at getting an Asperger’s diagnosis, which 
for her, provided an explanation of her difficulties, and deflected attribu-
tions of responsibility for previous aberrant behaviour.50 Thus, the diag-
nosis can have a positive effect, whereas undiagnosed, a person may have 
been blamed as lazy or socially tactless: diagnosis may lead to attribution 
of behavioural difficulties to biomedical causes, which improves others’ 
reactions.51
Autism is highly heterogeneous, and individuals may range from 
severely intellectually impaired and/or non-verbal to ‘high functioning’ 
and articulate. Detractors of the NDM argue the online self-advocates 
represent only the high-functioning extreme. Indeed it may be the 
medicalisation of less severe autism behaviours that has ironically given 
impetus to the NDM, as less severely impaired individuals have rallied 
under the autism banner, where previously they may not have been 
diagnosed. Francisco Ortega, describes the movement as a form of 
aggressive identity politics who appropriate the right to speak on behalf 
of every autistic person.52 It is certainly true that not all adults diag-
nosed with autism see their condition as a positive part of themselves, 
and some are pro-cure.53
The possibility that I could be very autistic for the rest of my life always 
upsets me. Therefore, when people talk about a cure I actually love to hear 
it. To be realistic, I know I will never be cured. The cause of my autism is a 
genetic anomaly and can’t be changed.54
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Whether or not total de-medicalisation of autism is a desirable out-
come, there are powerful forces at work that oppose this. The fact that 
autism is such a well-recognised phenotype with invested research, clin-
ical and commercial worlds reliant on its existence as a medical category 
adds to the entrenchment of the category. Cooper describes this process 
and argues this makes major de-medicalisation by DSM unlikely.55 This 
uncomfortable relationship with medical terminology, treatment, and a 
simultaneous rejection of a disordered identity is a familiar tenet of many 
of the social health movements and illustrates some of the inherent ten-
sions within these campaigns.
conclusIons
The NDM movement is an example of the kind of authentic expression 
that attempts to take mental health and disability conditions out from 
clinician’s control. It both uses and challenges the medicalisation of brain 
and behaviour in a way that offers a coherent and consistent critique of 
psychiatry while allowing for diversity within its members. Broderick and 
Ne’eman argue that the bulk of the support for framing autism within a 
disorder model, where it is viewed as a ‘disease’ external to the person 
comes from within the non‐autistic ‘NT’ community, whereas the bulk 
of the support for framing autism within a neurodiversity model comes 
from within the NDM and autistic community.56 They argue that NDM 
provides a counter‐narrative that can play a vital role in the resistance to 
ideological hegemony (which they view as the medical model of autism 
diagnosis). They position the NDM are essentially activists in the process 
of de-medicalisation of autism.
However, we have found that instead of providing a homogenous 
oppositional set of ideas, the NDM have struggled to define their rela-
tionship with psychiatric categories much like other consumer campaigns 
that adopt aspects of the medical model, while rejecting wholesale psy-
chiatric classification. Far from being a standardised voice, the NDM is 
also typical of other social health movement in the complex identity pol-
itics that co-mingle with the psychiatric labels, those of gender, age, sex-
uality, race, class amongst others, which continue to condition individual 
experiences.
The early phase of mad pride movement in the 1960s relied on a 
more homogenous notion of madness to anchor its resistance from insti-
tutionalisation and opposition to psychiatry borrowing strategies from 
8 CHALLENGING PSYCHIATRIC CLASSIFICATION: HEALTHY AUTISTIC …  183
the left, namely collective action, and from the right, especially elements 
of libertarianism. As the movement evolves, however, as with other social 
movements, identity politics have grown more complicated. The NDM 
provides an illustrative example of how some of those struggles have 
played out in a particular manifestation of experiences, ones brought 
together through a degree of commonality. Digital media technology, 
used very effectively by the NDM, also demonstrates a new layer in 
the discourse on consumer networks as unlike the 1960s where people 
needed to physically gather to generate a common set of political goals, 
and the internet allows for virtual meeting spaces and virtual identities.57 
It helps to complicate boundaries of citizenship and identity and offers, 
perhaps, a new model for consumer-survivor activism for the twenty-first 
century.
Acknowledgements  The second author’s work was generously funded by the 
Wellcome Trust, grant number 108676/Z/15/Z.
notes
 1.  We believe the first mad pride march took place in Vancouver, Canada in 
1963. It was a very small event, so small that organisers barely remem-
ber it taking place. But small though it was, it helped to put madness on 
the map in terms of human rights movements in the 1960s. See, “The 
Inmates Are Running the Asylum,” youtube.com (2013).
 2.  For example, see Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History of 
Insanity in the Age of Reason (New York: Vintage Books, 1965).
 3.  Ibid.
 4.  Thomas Szasz, The Myth of Mental Illness: Foundations of a Theory of 
Personal Conduct (New York: HarperCollins, 1974).
 5.  Erving Goffman, Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients 
and Other Inmates (New York: Anchor Books, 1961).
 6.  Ronald D. Laing, The Politics of Experience and the Bird of Paradise 
(London: Penguin Books, 1967).
 7.  For more on this topic, see Kathleen Kendall, “From Closed Ranks to 
Open Doors: Elaine and John Cummings’ Mental Health Education 
Experiment in 1950s Saskatchewan,” Histoire Sociale 44, no. 88 
(November 2011): 257–286; C. Dooley, “The End of the Asylum 
(Town): Community Responses to the Depopulation and Closure 
of the Saskatchewan Hospital, Weyburn,” Histoire Sociale 44, no. 88 
(November 2011): 331–354; Gerald Grob, From Asylum to Community: 
184  E. DYCK AND G. RUSSELL
Mental Health Policy in Modern America (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1991).
 8.  Paul Rabinow, Artificiality and Enlightenment: From Sociobiology to 
Biosociality: Anthropologies of Modernity (London: Blackwell, 1996), 
91–111.
 9.  Vololona Rabeharisoa et al., “Evidence-Based Activism: Patients’ 
Organisations, Users and Activist’s Groups in Knowledge,” BioSocieties 9, 
no. 2 (2014): 111–128.
 10.  “Two Autistic People Speak,” Autism News Science and Opinion, posted 
December 19, 2006. https://leftbrainrightbrain.co.uk/2006/12/19/
two-autistic-people-speak/. Accessed 17 March 2018.
 11.  Joyce Davidson, “Autistic Culture Online: Virtual Communication and 
Cultural Expression on the Spectrum,” Social and Cultural Geography 9, 
no. 7 (November 2008): 791–806.
 12.  Lyons Fitzgerald, “Asperger (1906–1980) and Kanner (1894–1981), the 
Two Pioneers of Autism,” Journal of Autism Developmental Disorders 37, 
no. 10 (November 2007): 2022–2023.
 13.  Francesca Happé, Angelica Ronald, and Robert Plomin, “Time to Give 
Up on a Single Explanation for Autism,” Nature Neuroscience 9, no. 10 
(October 2006): 18–20.
 14.  Courtenay F. Norbury and Alison Sparks, “Difference or Disorder? 
Cultural Issues in Understanding Neurodevelopmental Disorders,” 
Developmental Psychology 49, no. 1 (January 2013): 45–58.
 15.  Chloe Silverman, Understanding Autism: Parents, Doctors, and the History 
of a Disorder (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 354.
 16.  Richard P. Bentall, Madness Explained: Psychosis and Human Nature 
(London: Penguin Books, 2004), 656.
 17.  “Autism: Pro-existance, Anti-cure.” http://www.angelfire.com/space2/
autism/. Accessed 17 March 2018.
 18.  Michelle Dawson, “The Misbehaviour of Behaviorists: Ethical Challenges 
to the Autism-ABA Industry” (2004). http://www.sentex.net/~nexus23/
naa_aba.html, Accessed 17 March 2018.
 19.  A. Baggs, “In My Language” (2007) [Cited 2014 October 10]. http://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=JnylM1hI2jc.
 20.  “The Obsessive Joy of Autism.” https://juststimming.wordpress.
com/2011/04/05/the-obsessive-joy-of-autism/. Accessed on 19 March 
2018.
 21.  www.eugenics.archive.ca. Accessed 17 March 2018.
 22.  Gabriella Coleman, “The Politics of Rationality: Psychiatric Survivors’ 
Challenge to Psychiatry,” in Tactical Biopolitics, eds. Kavita Philip and 
Beatriz da Costa (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008), 341.
 23.  Ibid.
8 CHALLENGING PSYCHIATRIC CLASSIFICATION: HEALTHY AUTISTIC …  185
 24.  For further examples of survivor documents and scholarship, see the 
Psychiatric Survivor Archives of Toronto; Bonnie Burstow and Don 
Weitz, eds., Shrink Resistant: The Struggle Against Psychiatry in Canada 
(Vancouver: New Star Books, 1998).
 25.  V. Finkelstein, Changing Attitudes and Disabled People: Issues for 
Discussion (World Rehabilitation Fund, 1979); Michael Oliver, The 
Politics of Disablement: A Sociological Approach (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1997), 152.
 26.  Grace Hewson, “Letters to the Editor,” The Guardian (2001) reposted 
on “Autism: The Question of Cure,” neurodiversity.com. http://neuro-
diversity.com/cure.html. Accessed 17 March 2018.
 27.  Sally Satel and Scott O. Lilienfeld, Brainwashed: The Seductive Appeal of 
Mindless Neuroscience (New York: Basic Civitas Books, 2013), 288.
 28.  Nikolas Rose, The Politics of Life Itself: Biomedicine, Power, and 
Subjectivity in the Twenty-First Century (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2006).
 29.  “What Is Neurotypical?” (2013). https://musingsofanaspie.com/2013/ 
01/10/what-is-neurotypical/. Accessed 17 March 2018.
 30.  F. Ortega, “The Cerebral Subject and the Challenge of Neurodiversity,” 
BioSocieties 4, no. 4 (2009): 425–445.
 31.  Daniel Smail, On Deep History and the Brain (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2007).
 32.  Laing, Politics of Experience.
 33.  Committee on Children with Disabilities, “The Pediatrician’s Role in the 
Diagnosis and Management of Autistic Spectrum Disorder in Children,” 
Pediatrics 107, no. 5 (May 2001): 1221–1226.
 34.  Sara O’Neil, “The Meaning of Autism: Beyond Disorder,” Disability and 
Society 23, no. 7 (2008): 787–799.
 35.  “Autism: Pro-existance, Anti-cure.” http://www.angelfire.com/space2/
autism/. Accessed 17 March 2018.
 36.  Donna Rosinski, “Wading into the Gene Pool: Questions and Answers 
About Autism and Genetics.” http://neurodiversity.com/cure.html. 
Accessed 17 March 2018.
 37.  Amitta Shah and Uta Frith, “An Islet of Ability in Autistic Children: 
A Research Note,” Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 24, no. 4 
(October 1983): 613–620.
 38.  Elmindreda, “Don’t Touch My Brain.” http://neurodiversity.com/posi-
tive.html. Accessed 17 March 2018.
 39.  Graham Hart and Kaye Wellings, “Sexual Behaviour and Its 
Medicalisation: in Sickness and in Health,” British Medical Journal 13, 
no. 324 (7342) (April 2002): 896–900.
186  E. DYCK AND G. RUSSELL
 40.  See, for example, Gary Kinsman, “‘Character Weaknesses’ and ‘Fruit 
Machines’: Towards an Analysis of the Anti-homosexual Security 
Campaign in the Canadian Civil Service,” Labour/Le Travail 35 (1995): 
133–161; Elise Chenier, Strangers in Our Midst: Sexual Deviancy in 
Post-war Ontario (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008). For 
contemporary controversy on this topic and psychiatrist Robert Spitzer, 
see, for example, Paul Harris “Psychiatrist Who Championed ‘Gay’ 
Cure Admits He Was Wrong,” The Guardian, 9 May 2012 [Cited 10 
October 2014]. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/may/19/
psychiatrist-admits-gay-cure-study-flawed.
 41.  Karl Bryant, “Diagnosis and Medicalization,” in Sociology of Diagnosis, 
eds. P. J. Mcgann et al. (Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing, 2011); 
M. C. Burke, “Resisting Pathology: GID and the Contested Terrain of 
Diagnosis in the Transgender Rights Movement,” Sociology of Diagnosis: 
156–183.
 42.  Keely Cheslack-Postava and Rebecca Jordan-Young, “Autism Spectrum 
Disorders: Toward a Gendered Embodiment Model,” Social Science and 
Medicine 74, no. 11 (July 2011): 1667–1674.
 43.  Lin Fraser et al., “Recommendations for Revision of the DSM Diagnosis 
of Gender Identity Disorder in Adults,” International Journal on 
Transgenderism 12, no. 2 (2010): 80–85.
 44.  Simon Baron-Cohen et al., “Prevalence of Autism-Spectrum Conditions: 
UK School-Based Population Study,” British Journal of Psychiatry 194, 
no. 6 (June 2009): 500–509.
 45.  “Cure for Autism?” originally from http://within.autistics.org/nocure.
html, http://neurodiversity.com/cure.html. Accessed 17 March 2018.
 46.  Kit Weintraub, “Guest Voice: A Mother’s Perspective” (2004). http://
www.sentex.net/~nexus23/301-350.html. Accessed March 2018.
 47.  Jim Sinclair, “Don’t Mourn for Us” (1993), based on an article published 
in the Autism Network International Newsletter, Our Voice 1, no. 3. 
http://www.autreat.com/dont_mourn.html. Accessed 17 March 2018.
 48.  Carl Elliot, “A New Way of Being Mad,” Atlantic Monthly 286 (2000): 
76–86.
 49.  See the recent debates on hamspro@googlegroups.com, in particular the 
tense discussions between Stanton Peele and Gabor Mate as they consider 
the consequences of being pigeon-holed into particular political camps 
within this treatment and empowerment framework.
 50.  Catherine Deveney, “Susan Boyle: My Relief at Discovering That I have 
Asperger’s,” The Guardian, 8 December 2013. https://www.theguard-
ian.com/music/2013/dec/08/susan-boyle-autism. Accessed 17 March 
2018.
8 CHALLENGING PSYCHIATRIC CLASSIFICATION: HEALTHY AUTISTIC …  187
 51.  Ginny Russell and Brahm Norwich, “Dilemmas, Dilemmas and 
Destigmatization: Parental Perspectives on the Diagnosis of Autism Spectrum 
Disorders,” Clinical Child Psychology and Psychiatry 17, no. 2 (April 2012): 
229–45.
 52.  F. Oretga, “The Cerebral Subject and the Challenge of Neurodiversity,” 
Biosocieties 4, no. 4 (2009): 425–445.
 53.  Charlotte Brownlow, “Presenting the Self: Negotiating a Label of 
Autism,” Journal of Intellectual Development and Disability 35, no. 1 
(March 2010): 14–21.
 54.  Sue Rubin, “Acceptance Versus Cure” (2005). CNN.com. Accessed 17 
March 2018.
 55.  Rachel Cooper, Classifying Madness: A Philosophical Examination of 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (Dordrecht, 
Netherlands: Springer Science & Business Media, 2005): 198.
 56.  Alicia Broderick and Ari Ne’eman, “Autism as Metaphor: Narrative and 
Counter‐Narrative,” International Journal of Inclusive Education 12, 
nos. 5–6 (September–November 2008): 459–476.
 57.  For more on the role of the internet on this topic, see Elliott, “A New 
Way to Be Mad.”
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction 
in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original 
author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and 
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the 
chapter’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line 
to the material. If material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons 
license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds 
the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright 
holder.
